However, while working from May 2002 through February
2003 in the office of
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Near East South Asia and
Special
Plans (USDP/NESA and SP) in the Pentagon, I observed the environment
in
which decisions about post-war Iraq were made.
Those observations changed everything.
What I saw was aberrant, pervasive and contrary to good order and discipline.
If one is seeking the answers to why peculiar bits of "intelligence''
found sanctity in a presidential speech, or why the post-Hussein occupation
has been distinguished by confusion and false steps, one need look
no further than the process inside the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
I can identify three prevailing themes.
Functional isolation of the professional corps. Civil service and active-duty
military professionals assigned to the USDP/NESA and SP were noticeably
uninvolved in key areas of interest to Undersecretary for Policy
Douglas Feith, Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld. These
included
Israel, Iraq and to a lesser extent, Saudi Arabia.
When the New York Times broke the story last summer of Richard Perle's invitation
of Laurent Muraviec to brief the Defense Policy Board on Saudi Arabia
as the next enemy of the United States, this briefing
was news to the Saudi desk officer. He even had some difficulty getting
a copy of it,
while receiving assignments related to it.
In terms of Israel and Iraq, all primary staff work was conducted by
political appointees, in the case of Israel a desk officer appointee
from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, and in the case
of Iraq,
Abe Shulsky and several other appointees. These personnel may be exceptionally
qualified; Shulsky authored a 1993 textbook Silent Warfare: Understanding
the World of Intelligence.
But the human resource depth made possible through broad-based teamwork
with
the professional policy and intelligence corps was never established,
and apparently, never wanted by the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld organization.
Cross-agency cliques: Much has been written about the role of the
founding members of the Project for a New American Century, the Center for Security
Policy and the American Enterprise Institute and their new positions in the Bush
administration. Certainly, appointees sharing particular viewpoints are expected
to congregate, and an overwhelming number of these appointees
having such organizational ties is neither conspiratorial nor unusual.
What is unusual is the way this network operates solely with its membership
across the various agencies -- in particular the State Department,
the National
Security Council and the Office of the Vice President.
Within the Central Intelligence Agency, it was less clear to me who
the appointees were, if any. This might explain the level of interest
in the CIA taken by the Office of the Vice President.
In any case,
I personally witnessed several cases of staff officers being told not to
contact their counterparts at State or the National Security Council because
that
particular decision would be processed through a different channel. This cliquishness
is cause for amusement in such movies as Never Been Kissed or The Hot Chick.
In the development and implementation of war planning it is neither amusing nor
beneficial for American security because opposing points of view and information
that doesn't "fit'' aren't considered.
Groupthink.
Defined as reasoning or decision-making by a group, often characterized
by uncritical acceptance or conformity to" prevailing points of view,''
groupthink was, and probably remains, the predominant characteristic of
Pentagon Middle East policy development. The result of groupthink is the
elevation of opinion into a kind of accepted "fact,'' and uncritical acceptance
of extremely narrow and isolated points of view.
The result of groupthink
has been extensively studied in the history of American foreign policy,
and it will have a prominent role when the history of the Bush administration
is written. Groupthink, in this most recent case
leading to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, will be found, I believe, to
have caused a subversion of constitutional limits on executive power and a co-optation
through deceit of a large segment of the Congress.

The result of groupthink is the elevation of opinion into
a kind of accepted "fact,'' and uncritical acceptance of extremely narrow
and isolated points of view.

I am now retired. Shortly before my retirement I was allowed to return to my
primary office of assignment, having served in NESA as a desk officer backfill
for 10 months.
The
transfer was something I had sought, but my wish was granted only
after I made a particular comment to my superior, in response to my
reading
of a February Secretary of State cable answering a long list of questions
from a Middle Eastern country regarding U.S. planning for the aftermath
in Iraq. The answers had been heavily crafted by the
Pentagon, and to me, they were remarkably inadequate, given the late
stage of the game. I suggested to my boss that if this was as good
as it got, some
folks on the Pentagon's E-ring may be sitting beside Hussein in the
war crimes tribunals.
Hussein is not yet sitting before a war crimes tribunal. Nor have the
key decision-makers in the Pentagon been forced to account for the
odd set of circumstances that placed us as a long-term occupying force in
the world's nastiest rat's nest, without a nation-building plan, without
significant international support and without an exit plan. Neither
may ever be required
to answer their accusers, thanks to this administration's military
as well as publicity machine, and the disgraceful political compromises
already made by most of the Congress. Ironically, only Saddam Hussein,
buried under
tons of rubble or in hiding, has a good excuse. << back |