Peace Archive - Jennifer Hewett

From the perspective of 2003, the 1990s now look benign, a world where the growth of economic prosperity, military security and liberal democracy were accepted as part of the inevitable progress of history.

Yes, massacres in Rwanda, Bosnia and East Timor - and the impossibility of reaching a Palestinian-Israeli settlement - did occasionally disturb this intellectual complacency ...

But once the horror of Rwanda (and the failure of the UN to act) faded, Kosovo was bombed (without UN approval) and the peacekeepers finally went into East Timor, the world's attention always reverted to more pleasant pastimes, like making money in the boom that would never end.

Now the illusion of money is disappearing into the ether even more rapidly than it came, replaced by fear and uncertainty. Pervasive gloom has settled upon world psychology. And the longer the uncertainty goes on, the worse the mood becomes for the Bush Administration, allowing time for the opposition in the US itself to build.

The Americans will have learnt a hard lesson about the risks of consulting with allies if they already know what they intend to do. What is now awkwardly evident is that the Bush Administration miscalculated the willingness of the French, in particular, to take it on. The anti-French jokes were very pointed but, until the last week or so, America remained confident that France wouldn't ultimately use its veto.

Instead, America's willingness to delay war in an attempt to get UN backing has only hardened the opposition and the almost joyous celebration around the world of defying US will. What complicates things is that the European-led opposition is not just about war with Iraq. It reflects the fomenting antagonism in "old Europe" - and just about everywhere else - to US power. Such fashionable anti-American resentment simmered away through the '90s, too, especially as the old Soviet enemy had disintegrated along with the sustaining practical reason for the alliance with the US.

But the schism was partly masked by former president Bill Clinton's more urbane manner and his extreme reluctance to use force or endanger a single US soldier's life.

Unlike both his father and Clinton, however, Bush has always been much more inclined to judge the world in terms of right and wrong rather than shades of maybe.

And the US now feels far more morally and strategically justified about the need to demonstrate its power if it believes itself threatened - which it absolutely does. Humility, never a dominant US trait, has been vanquished by resolve and Bush's "wanted dead or alive" style.

Howard has great trouble explaining to a sceptical Australia how much the American mindset has altered since September 11, 2001, especially in contrast to this country's more muted reaction after Bali.

The governments of France, Germany and Russia - bolstered by the surging popularity of the anti-war cause in their own countries - argue that this tough American approach is a greater danger than a fundamental split within the West.

They also cynically see it as an opportunity to present themselves as the moderate, multilateral alternative to US power.

Their appeal will quickly wear thin in practice, but such rancorous division means a dangerous and unpredictable course for us all.
Howard will be hoping that the worst of the politics is almost over and that the mood will improve again after a relatively quick war and a demonstration of the evils of Saddam. But there are no guarantees.
These are hard times.

This story was found at:
http://www.smh.com.au/.


	From the perspective of 2003, the 1990s now look benign, a world where the growth of economic prosperity, military security and liberal democracy were accepted as part of the inevitable progress of history. Yes, massacres in Rwanda, Bosnia and East Timor - and the impossibility of reaching a Palestinian-Israeli settlement - did occasionally disturb this intellectual complacency ... But once the horror of Rwanda (and the failure of the UN to act) faded, Kosovo was bombed (without UN approval) and the peacekeepers finally went into East Timor, the world's attention always reverted to more pleasant pastimes, like making money in the boom that would never end. Now the illusion of money is disappearing into the ether even more rapidly than it came, replaced by fear and uncertainty. Pervasive gloom has settled upon world psychology. And the longer the uncertainty goes on, the worse the mood becomes for the Bush Administration, allowing time for the opposition in the US itself to build. The Americans will have learnt a hard lesson about the risks of consulting with allies if they already know what they intend to do. What is now awkwardly evident is that the Bush Administration miscalculated the willingness of the French, in particular, to take it on. The anti-French jokes were very pointed but, until the last week or so, America remained confident that France wouldn't ultimately use its veto. Instead, America's willingness to delay war in an attempt to get UN backing has only hardened the opposition and the almost joyous celebration around the world of defying US will. What complicates things is that the European-led opposition is not just about war with Iraq. It reflects the fomenting antagonism in "old Europe" - and just about everywhere else - to US power. Such fashionable anti-American resentment simmered away through the '90s, too, especially as the old Soviet enemy had disintegrated along with the sustaining practical reason for the alliance with the US. But the schism was partly masked by former president Bill Clinton's more urbane manner and his extreme reluctance to use force or endanger a single US soldier's life. Unlike both his father and Clinton, however, Bush has always been much more inclined to judge the world in terms of right and wrong rather than shades of maybe. And the US now feels far more morally and strategically justified about the need to demonstrate its power if it believes itself threatened - which it absolutely does. Humility, never a dominant US trait, has been vanquished by resolve and Bush's "wanted dead or alive" style. Howard has great trouble explaining to a sceptical Australia how much the American mindset has altered since September 11, 2001, especially in contrast to this country's more muted reaction after Bali. The governments of France, Germany and Russia - bolstered by the surging popularity of the anti-war cause in their own countries - argue that this tough American approach is a greater danger than a fundamental split within the West. They also cynically see it as an opportunity to present themselves as the moderate, multilateral alternative to US power. Their appeal will quickly wear thin in practice, but such rancorous division means a dangerous and unpredictable course for us all. Howard will be hoping that the worst of the politics is almost over and that the mood will improve again after a relatively quick war and a demonstration of the evils of Saddam. But there are no guarantees. These are hard times. This story was found at: http://www.smh.com.au/. << back
	about us \| quotes \| featured article \| editorial \| archive \| letters for america \| links \| desiderata \| home copyright information ©2000-2009 Lyrebird Media.